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A ThEORY OF THE WELFARE STATE
ABSTRACT
The welfare state can be seen as an insurance device that makes lifetime careers safer,
increases risk taking and suffers from moral hazard effects. Adopting this view, the paper studies
the trade-off between average income and inequality, evaluating redistributive equilibria from an
allocative point of view. It identifies the properties of an optimal welfare state and shows that
constant returns to risk taking are likely to imply a redistribution paradox where more
redistribution results in more inequality. In general, optimal taxation will either imply that the
redistribution paradox is present or that the economy operates at a point of its efficiency frontier







and NBERI. Redisiribulion and Insurance
While this may be the time to turn the welfare state around, it is also the time to warn against
throwing the baby out with the bathwater. Economists have learned so much about the Laffer
curve, Leviathan, and a myriade of disincentive effects brought about by government
intervention that they have lost sight of the allocative advantages of the welfare state.'
From an allocative point of view, the main advantage of the welfare state is the
insurance or risk reducing function of redistributive taxation. To finance commonly accessible
public goods and public transfers, governments take more taxes from the rich than from the
poor, thus reducing the variance of real lifetime incomes. To the extent that the variance of
lifetime incomes is not predictable when people are born, this activity can be regarded as
welfare increasing insurance. Every insurance contract involves a redistribution of resources
from the lucky to the unlucky, and most redistributive measures of the state can be interpreted
as insurance if the time span between judging and taking these measures is sufficiently long.
Redistributive taxation and insurance are two sides of the same coin.
It is true, in principle, that the insurance function of the government budget could
possibly have been privately provided. However, it is difficult to imagine endowing private
agencies with the extensive monitoring and enforcement rights enjoyed by tax authorities, and
in the absence of such rights, moral hazard and adverse selection problems render a broad
based private solution impossible. Also, of course, if the need for fiscal taxation is taken as
given, then the marginal cost of making the existing tax system redistributive may well be
lower than the cost of introducing additional private insurance. The historical growth of the
welfare state can, in part, be seen as a response to the private insurance system's inability to
offer the cheaper solution.
While the production of safety is an important function of the welfare state, the Domar-
Musgrave effect of increased risk taking may be even more important. Protected by the welfare
state people engage in risky and profitable activities which they otherwise would not have
dared to undertake. Risky occupations might not be chosen without the protection of the
'In fact, none of the favourable allocative effects of the welfare state discussed in this paper have been
mentioned in the illuminating and important book "Turning Sweden Around" by Lindbeck, Molander, Persson
and others (1994). The authors do not even include the redistribution of income in their list of "Basic
responsibilities of the state"; ci. pp.14-16.2
welfare state, and it would be difficult to find entrepreneurs to supervise risky investment if the
debtor's prison were all the society provided in the case of failure. It is perhaps the most
important function of the social welfare net that it makes people jump over the dangerous
chasms which otherwise would have put a halt to their economic endeavors.
It may, in fact, make them too eager to jump. Protected by the welfare state, people
may neglect to take the necessary care, may take too much risk, and end up in a worse
situation than without such protection. This is the fear that an overwhelming majority of policy
advisors seems to have.
The effect on risk taking has important repercussions for the observable degree of
inequality in the economy, for, if a given set of people will chose more risk ex ante, they will
typically be more unequal ex post. Risk averse societies may exhibit relatively little inequality,
and the more redistribution there is, the larger the pre-tax inequality tolerated may be.
The paper offers a simple model that makes it possible to analyse the interaction
between redistributive taxation, risk taking, and inequality and provides unambiguous welfare
evaluations of the allocations achieved. As suggested by Harsanyi (1953, 1955), Rawls (1971),
and others, the social welfare function for evaluating the income distribution is identical with a
representative individual's utility function for risk evaluations. However, in the model, people
really are behind the veil of ignorance when they make their decisions and evaluate the
resulting income distribution. Their amount of risk taking ex ante determines their degree of
inequality ex post.
The paper's main focus is on the policy trade-off between income equality and per-
capita income. This is not on the trade-off between equity and efficiency, because equity is an
aspect of efficiency. Will redistributive taxation induce too much or too little risk taking? How
does it compare with ideal insurance? Will the pie shrink when it is more evenly distributed?
Will more redistribution result in less inequality? What are the properties of an optimal
redistributive tax system? These are among the questions addressed in this paper.
While little is known about the issue, there are noteworthy exceptions from the general
lack of interest in the insurance function of redistributive taxation. The exceptions include the
literature on risk taking and taxation, jn the context of asset choice, savings or occupational3
decisions (see, e.g., Ahsan 1974, 1976, Allingham 1972, Atkinson and Stiglitz 1980, Barnberg
and Richter 1984, Domar and Musgrave 1944, Kanbur 1979, and Stiglitz 1969), as well as the
welfare theoretic literature extending the theory of optimal taxation to the case of income risks
(Diamond, Helms and Mirrlees 1980, Eaton and Rosen 1980, Vanan 1980, and Sinn 1981).
This paper owes an intellectual debt to all of these approaches. Above all, however, it gained
from Friedman's (1953) "Choice, Chance and the Personal Distribution of Income" and
Buchanan and Tullock's (1962) "Calculus of Consent", chapter 13. The paper can be seen as an
attempt to formalize, apply and extend their approaches.
2. The Model
A very simple model that is able to incorporate the issues discussed is the following. There is a
large number of identical individuals, each facing the same choice problem under uncertainty.
With stochastically independent income risks and identical choices, each person's probability
distribution of income converts to the economy's frequency distribution of realized incomes. If,
say, a single person's probability of having a lifetime income of between $ 500,000and
$ 510,000 is I %, then the law of large numbers will ensure that 1% of the population will
have an income in this range. Risk and expected income ex ante will turn out as inequality and
average income ex post.
To reduce the dimensionality of risk, a broad-based definition of income including
market income, non-market income, public goods and public transfers is used. The risk occurs
in the form of a random income loss L ￿0whose magnitude depends on the random state of
nature 0 and the cost of self-insurance e in terms of foregone market and non-market
resources. One may think, for example, of investment in physical and human capital limitingthe
risk of not reaching one's income goals. Let m and n be the maximum values of market and
non-market income attainable if the individual makes no effort and the loss nevertheless
happens to be zero, p be the value of transfers (monetary transfers and public goods) received,
and T be the individual's tax liability which also depends on 0 and e. Then the individual's
(post-tax) income is
Y=m+n—L(e,0)--e—T(e,0)+p. (I)4
An increase in effort e reduces the size of the income loss for all states of the world,
albeit with diminishing marginal returns. It is assumed that
L(e,O)=(e)O, O￿O,>O, (2)
X'<O,'￿O, '(O)=—co,
where X is a twice continously differentiable ftinction reflecting the efficacy of self-insurance.
There is a linear tax on market income. Let a be the fraction of self-insurance efforts
consisting of foregone market income and I —athe fraction consisting of foregone non-market
income. Then
T(e,O)= c[m_L(e,e)—cw] (3)
where 'r is the tax rate. Note that, despite the linearity of the tax, the taxsystemis
redistributive because the public transfer p is independent of the state of nature.2 Lucky
individuals are net payers and unlucky net recipients of public fi.inds.
To balance the government budget, the public transfer is chosen so as to make it equal
to the average tax liability:3
p=E[T(e,O)}. (4)
The income distribution in the economy described is specified once the government has
chosen -r and a ,andthe individuals have chosen e. It is convenient to describe this distribution




2The formal structure of the redistribution mechanism is similar to the progressive linear tax used by Ahsan
(1974, 1976) for a portfolio selection problem with fiscal taxation.
3Alternatively, itcouldhave been assumed that p ' (e ,e, ) /x where x is the number of individuals in
the economy. Because of the assumption of stochastic independence of the 0,,, j =Ix, the transfer
specified this way converges stochastically to E[T(e0)] as x goes to infinity.5
a (6)
where R (.)isthe standard deviation operator.4 Equations (5) and (6) show that, with any
given amount of self-insurance effort e,redistributivetaxation will not affect the average
income, ,butwill reduce the deviation from the average, a. Seen from an ex-ante perspective
this is the insurance aspect of redistributive taxation. The important question of how
redistnbutive taxation will in turn affect the amount of effort chosen will be postponed to the
next sections.
Figure 1 depicts the combinations of .ianda attainable with an appropriate choice of e
and for two alternative values of the tax rate: t= 0and r> 0.
The opportunity set of(l.t,a) combinations attainable with t =0will be called the "self-
insurance line" and the set attainable with a given r> 0 will be called the "redistribution line".
Geometrically, the redistribution line can be constructed by shifting all points on the self-
insurance line horizontally to the left where the percentage reduction of the distance from the
ordinate equals the tax rate. The movements of A, B, and C towards A', B', and C' are
examples of this shift. It is unclear at this stage which amount of self-insurance effort and
which pair of points on the two lines the individual choses. However, whatever his choice, all
attainable post-tax income distributions that satisf' the government's budget constraint (4) are
represented by points on the redistribution line.
4mroughout the paper E and R are used as expectation and standard deviation operators while tandare the
mean and standard deviation of post-redistribution income. Recall that
R(X) =[E(X2)_E2(X)J"2 andnote that E(a+bX) =a+bE(X) and R(a ÷bX) =lbIR(X).6











Since '(e) <0 implies that o is a monotonically declining function of e, it is possible to treat
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Itis easy to derive a boundary condition for the slope of the self-insurance line ,
5Equation (13) follows from (5), (7), andtheassumption '(O) =—.7
ii'(aG)=—kwhen e=O, (13)
andto show that theline has a maximum where '(e)E(O) =—1and is concave throughout:6
t'(a ){}o when?''(e){}O. (14)
Toclose the model, the representative agent's preference structure has to be specified.
It is assumed that the agent is a globally and locally risk averse expected utility maximizer.
Since the set of distributions implied by (1), (2), and (3) forms a linear class, any given von
Neumann-Morgenstern function can be exactly represented in terms of (ji,a)preferences
without any loss of generality.7 As shown by Meyer (1987) and Sinn (1983, 1989), there exists
a well-behaved utility function U(p.,a) if the von Neumann-Morgenstern function is well-
behaved. Its properties can best be summarized by the properties of the function
(15) da1, U
which indicates the indifference-curve slope -themarginal risk or inequality aversion -ata
particular combination oft and a:
(a)i(.i,0)=0(enter ordinate perpendicularly)
(b)i(M,a) >0for a >0(upward bending)
(c) >0(strictly convex) da
(d)i>0(slope increases with a, given jx)8
61tfollows from (10) that I"(G)= X(e)/[(e)R2(9)]. Since X"￿O and X'<O the sign of this expression
is zero or negative.
7To prove that the attainable disthbutions belong to the same linear class, it is necessaiy to show that the
standardized distribution Z =[Y—E(Y)]/ R(Y) is independent of the model's choice variables e, 'r, and
a.Inserting (2) and (3) into (I) gives
m +n-X0-e-t{rn — — ae]+ p- {m+ n —(e) — e— — XE(e)—
ae]+ p}
(l—)R(e)




tCondition (d) drives some of the results of this paper. It has been proved under the condition that absolute risk
aversion is decreasing. is constant, or does not increase faster than with the "fastest" quadratic utility function8
1> increasing
(e)i, =0forconstantabsolute risk aversion (slope change with .t,giveno).
decreasing
Figure 2 illustrates an example of the indifference-curve system for the case of constant
absolute risk aversion.
Figure 2: Evaluating Income Distributions
While the preference map of Figure 2 makes it possible to evaluate probability
distributions, it allows an equally appropriate evaluation of the realized income distributions.
Since people have identical risk preferences and since the probability distribution chosen
translates into an identical frequency distribution of realized incomes, an unambiguous social
welfare function is available.
3. Laissez Faire and the Social Optimum
Imposing the "indifference map" of Figure 2 on the "feasibility map" of Figure 1 gives two
kinds of optima, illustrated by points T and Q'inFigure 3. Point 7' is the laissez faire optimum
without redistributive taxation and Q'isthe optimum with redistribution at a given tax rate
r> 0. Let T' and Q be the counterparts of these two points on the redistribution line and the
self-insurance line, respectively.9 Formally, the two solutions follow from the problem
max U(i,a)s. t. j.t=ji(a0), a=(1—t)a0 (16) aG
compatiblewith stnctly positive marginal utility in the relevant range. See Sum (1989). It is assumed that this
condition will hold.
9Throughout the paper, points labelled with a prime ;lre located on the redistribution line horizontally left of
the respcctive points without a prime which are locat'd on the self-insurance line. Points labelled by the same
letter indicate the same self-insurance effort.9
which implies the first order condition
•1—I\(\1 Pa
(17) l—t
The left-hand side of (17) is the indifference curve slope and the right-hand side is the slope of
the redistribution line. In general, (17) refers to a point like Q';however,in the limiting case
where t= 0it also captures the laissez faire solution 71
Figure 3: The Socially Optimal Degree of Risk Taking,
given the Tax Rate
(j)Insurance effect
©Risktaking effect
Thesolution illustrated in Figure 3 is a constrained Pareto optimum, defining the
optimal level of self-insurance efforts given the tax rate. It will not necessarily be reached by
private actions, since the redistribution line may not coincide with the opportunity set as
perceived by the individual. It would, however, be attained in an ideal insurance market where
individual actions can be monitored by the company and a fair premium is announced for each
self-insurance strategy the individual may chose. It would also be attained if a strict
equivalence principle of taxation could be met. The government would have to be able to
monitor the individual self-insurance activities and announce a separate value of the public
transfer for every feasible action, obviously an unrealistic requirement.





Proposition I' Underlaisse:faire,orwith ideal insurance, the society operates at a point in
its opportunity set where an increase in inequality would increase the average income.
Proposition 2: Redisiribulive taxation has the potential for creating twokinds' ofwelfare gain.
It can increase welfare by increasing the equality of incomes, and it can increase ii even more
when more risk is taken and some equality is sacrJiced for a higher level of average income.
The socially optimal level of pre-tax inequality is an increasing function of the tax rate.
While Proposition I is obvious, Proposition 2 needs a
Proof: Assume that 0< t< I,let r (),i(.),and s(.) denote the slopes of the redistribution line,
the indifference curve, and the self-insurance line at the respective points (in Figure 3) named
in the brackets. By the definition of 7', s(T)=i(T), and, because of (8) and (9),
r(T') =r(T) I (i —> i(T).Property (d) of the indifference curve system ensures that
(T)>( r'),Thus r( 7") >j(7"). Together with the convexity of the indifference curves and the
concavity of jJ, this implies c(Q')>G(T') and a0(Q)>0(T).'°Whilethis proves that
taxation increases risk taking and pre-tax inequality in the large, the marginal effect of t on the
optimal level of c GG (Q). followsfrom implicitly differentiating (17):
d3(Q) i+i'a0(Q)(1—'r) >0 (18)
dt (i —. i[0(Q)]+,.( — — jT'[c(Q)]
Thedenominator of this expression is strictly positive if the second-order condition of problem
(1 7) is satisfied. This is the case since the indifference curves are strictly concave and the
redistribution ftinction is convex. The numerator is strictly positive since all items occurring
there are strictly positive. [Cf. property (d) of the indifference curve system.] Q.e.d.
Proposition I is the model's confirmation of the frequently expressed belief that the pie
can grow when a more unequal distribution of its slices is tolerated. Risk aversion (or
inequality aversion) requires a compromise between the goals of maximizing the size of the pie
and minimizing the degree of inequality. It makes it wise to operate at a point of the efficiency
'°Thenotation should beself-explanatory. For example c(T')isthe post-ax standard deviation at point T'
which isthe counterpart of c(T),thepre-tax standarddeviation. Note that c,(T') =(i
—II
frontier where a little more tolerance with regard to the latter makes it possible to come a bit
closer to the former.
Proposition 2 confirms the discussion of the introduction to this paper. Given that the
government offers public insurance, the need for self-insurance is reduced. Redistributive
taxation increases the marginal post-tax return to risk taking (the slope of the redistribution
line as compared to that of the self-insurance line) and lowers the marginal compensation for
risk taking that the agent requires (the indifference curve slope). This makes it socially optimal
to tolerate more risk and inequality in exchange for a higher level of average income. Under
the protection of the welfare state more can be dared."
The risk taking effect of the welfare state may have wide reaching implications. In a
broader context, risk can be seen as a factor of production, a necessary input for the economy
without which a high level of productivity could not be achieved.'2 The factor "risk" is
probably no less important than "waiting", the factor economists have familiarized themselves
with under the name of capital. If the real rate of interest is a measure of the importance of
waiting and if the unexplained remainder of the "return to capital" is in fact the reward for risk
taking, then risk taking should be considered at least as responsible for economic prosperity as
capital investment. The enhancement of risk taking may be the most important economic
function the welfare state can perform.
4. Redistributive Taxation and the Oplimality of Individual Choice
While the previous section demonstrated the potential for gains from redistributive taxation,
this section addresses the more interesting question of whether the exploitation of this potential
through individual choice can be expected. The crucial assumption of this section is that the
government transfer p is not tailored to the individual decision. The individual agent takes this
transfer as exogenous to its own decisions, notwithstanding the fact that it will endogenously
be determined in equilibrium through the government budget constraint, equation (4).
'Surprisingly, the benefits from increased risk taking have been largely ignored in the private insurance
literature. Often the insurance-induced increase of risk taking is confused with moral hazard resulting from a
lack of observability of individual actions.
'2Sec Pigou (1932, Appendix I, pp.771-781), Sian (1986), or Konrad (1992).12
The individual opportunity set of decision alternatives is given by equation (1). Taking
expectations, noting that i(o0) =rn+n—E(L)—e from (10), and using (3) yields
=i(aG)—tm—E[L(e,8)}—ae}+p. (19)
After a few algebraic manipulations making use of(l 1), equation (19) can also be written as
=(o.)(1
—at) — t(1 —ct)(m— ky0)+atn +p. (20)
The standard deviation as perceived by the individual follows from (1), (3), and (7):
(21)
Since p was also non-stochastic in the social planning problem, this is the same as equation (9).
Equations (20) and (21) imply an opportunity locus in spacethat will be called the
"individual opportunity line".
The agent's optimization problem is
max U(x,a)s. t. (20) and (21). (22)
Using (15), the first order condition of this problem can be written a&3
—' 1—att
+—(1—a)k. (23) 1—t 1—t
The left-hand side of equation (23) is the indifference curve slope, and the right-hand side is
the slope of the individual opportunity line.
A redistributive equilibrium is defined as a situation where the agent has chosen a so
as to maximize his utility and the government has chosen the public transfer so as to satisfy its
budget constraint (4). In equilibrium, therefore, (23) has to hold on the redistribution line (cf
Figures 1 and 3) which means that the indifference curve slope refers to a point where
=j:i() and c=(i—t)c0
13The second-order condition is satisfied since the indifference curves are convex and (20) and (21) define a
concave curve in (,y) spacerepresenting the individual opportunity set as perceived by the agent.13
A comparison with (17) reveals that the equilibrium satisfying (23) is not in general
identical with the constrained Pareto optimum characterized by the pair (Q,Q)inFigure 3. The
next three sections analyze the differences.'4
4./ Deductible Efforts
Inthe case cx =1,the cost of self-insurance occurs exclusively in the form of foregone market
resources and will therefore enjoy full tax deductibility. One may think in particular of
pecuniary investment outlays or business expenses that are fully tax deductible. In an
intertemporal context, a cash flow tax would be an exact example for the case a =1because it
allows an immediate write-off of investment expenses.'5 A capital income tax with annual
economic depreciation allowances would instead be equivalent to O<ct <1, because the
present value of depreciation allowances falls short of the investment.
The implications of(23) for the case a =Iare summarized in
Proposition 3: W7wi: sc/f-insurance efforts are fully tax-deductible (as with investmentunder
a cash flow tax) redisiributivetaxationis welfare increasing. In addition to the direct gaii
from insurance there is a gain from increased risk taking. However, risk takingand the
resulting increase in inequality are less than what would be socially optimal.
Proof: If a =I,condition (23) becomes
(24)
Assume that t> oand let i(.) and s(.) denote the slopes of the indifference curve and the self-
insurance line at the respective points (from Figure 4) named in the brackets. Using this
notation, condition (24) defines a point V' on the redistribution line and its counterpartV
horizontally to the right on the self-insurance line such that i(V') =s(V).From (17) it is known
that i(Q') =s(Q)i(i —> s(Q)On the other hand, property (d) of the indifference curve
system and the definition of Timply that i(T') <i(T) =s(T).Continuity implies that a solution
t4The sections also prove the existence of equilibrium. Stability is analyzed in the appendix.
5The variables or the model will then have to be interpreted in terms of present values.14
exists between T' and Q' on the redistribution line;i.e., a(T) <c(V') <(Q') and
G(T)<(V)<..,(Q), q.e.d.
The intuition for the suboptimality of individual risk taking can best be gained by
inspecting (19) Suppose the individual had chosen the socially optimal level ofand
considers a small variation by changing his self-insurance effort. This variation will, in general,
change his expected tax liability, t{m—E[L]—cw}. If the public transfer p is changed
accordingly so as to satisfy the government budget constraint (4), then the variation in 0G
impliesno change in the expected net payment to the government, and, by assumption,
expected utility stays constant. However, ifp stays constant despite the change in the expected
tax liability, expected utility will change. The individual will have an incentive to deviate from
the social optimum in the direction where the expected tax liability declines and where he can
expect to become a net recipient of public funds. Assuming an endogenous change inp would
require collective rationality. With individual rationality, p has to be taken as exogenous,
because the agent knows that his taxes will contribute only a negligible fraction to the
government budget and will therefore not be able to affect the volume of public transfers
returned
For the case a. =1,this argument implies that the representative agent takes less risk
and choses a lower degree of inequality than is socially optimal, optimality being judged by his
own preferences. The expected tax base is m —E(L)
—e}.Since it differs from the expected
income i() only by the non-market component of income, n, which is a constant, the
expected tax liability can be reduced by lowering income and enjoying the advantage of lower
risk.'5
Figure 4: Less than Optimal Inequality with Full Deductibility of
Se/f-Insurance Efforts (Cash Flow Tax)
Individual
opportunity lines
Figure 4 illustrates this reasoning. The broken line through Q'isthe individual
opportunity line, given the level of public transfers p that would be paid if the agents chose the
socially optimal level of self-insurance effort. The individual believes that he will be able to
reach a higher indifference curve by moving to the left of Q';i.e.,by reducing a. In fact,
however, if everyone does so, the transfer will have to be reduced and the realized point in
(,a) space is pushed down, back to the redistribution line. The equilibrium is at a point such
as V. Here an indifference curve is tangent to an individual opportunity line, and the point of
tangency is also on the redistribution line. The individual does not want to change his behavior,
and the government budget is balanced.
4.2 Non-deductible Efforts
Consider now the other extreme case a =0.Here, the opportunity cost of effort occurs
exclusively in the form of non-market income foregone, and non-market income is untaxed.
The case can be interpreted in terms of the familiar labor-leisure distortion if leisure is, in fact,
an activity producing non-market income and if the tax is imposed on labor income alone, The






Figure5: Excessive Inequality without Deductibility of
Self-Insurance (Labor Income Tax)
Inspecting (19) shows that the expected tax base now reduces to m—E[L]}. Since m
is a constant, the base is smaller the greater E{L] and hence the larger the amount of risk
taking as measured by °G[cf.equation (11)]. Thus the intuitive argument raised above
suggests that the individual will want to deviate to the right from the social optimum Q'in
Figure 5 in order to become a net recipient of public funds. There is an individual opportunity
line cutting through the redistribution line at point Q'frombelow such that a higher
indifference curve seems to be attainable by increasing c and o. Again, however, if everyone
behaves that way, the public transfer p will have to be reduced, and the individual's position
will be pushed downward, back to the redistribution line. The equilibrium V where an
indifference curve is tangent to the individual opportunity line, and where the point of the
tangency is, in addition, located on the redistribution line, will be to the right of Q',possibly
even to the right of the maximum as shown in the figure. This intuitive result is confirmed by
Proposition 4: When self-insurance efforts are not tax-deductible (as with a labor income lax,)
there will be some self-insurance effort but not enough. risk taking overshoots the social
optimum, and too much inequality will result.








Assume 0 <t < Iand let r(.)andi(.) denote the slopes of the self-insurance line and the
indifference curve at the respective points (from Figure 5) named in the brackets. Let A be the
end point of the self-insurance line where e= 0and recall from (13) that r(A)= —k, Ic being a
strictly positive parameter characterizing the distribution of 0 (the state of the world). Recall
furthermore from (17) that the social optimum is defined by r(Q)—i(Q')(l—t)= 0. Equation
(25) defines a point V' on the redistribution line and its counterpart V horizontally to the right
on the self-insurance line such that r(V)—i(V')(l—t)=—tk. Since i￿0, this implies
r(V)> r(A) which, because of the concavity of the self-insurance line, defines a point to the
left of A. Moreover the concavity of the self-insurance line and the strict convexity of the
indifference curves imply that r(V) —i(V')(1 —t) <0can only hold true to the right of the the
social optimum. Thus c(Q') <t(V') <(A') and 0(Q)<0(v)<0(A), q.e.d.
-1.3 The General Case
Since a =0implies too much and a =1too little inequality relative to the social optimum,
there should be an intermediate value of a where the right amount of inequality can be





where (aG)isa function that indicates the level of a that equates the slope of the individual
opportunity line with the slope of the redistribution line at a given level of a. Let (Q)be
the socially optimal level of o. Then setting a = willensure that the equilibrium
coincides with the social optimum. Uniqueness of(26) and continuity of(23) imply that higher
levels of a will induce too little, and lower levels too much, risk taking and inequality.
Note that the optimal level of a depends on the size of the tax rate because the optimal
amount of risk taking does so. From Proposition 2 and equation (18) it is known that(Q)is
a strictly increasing function of t.SincejT' ￿0,the optimal level of a increases with twhere
<0 and stays constant where j' =0.18
It is known from property (a) of the indifference system that =0when a =0.In
the limit, where t— Iand the redistribution line is compressed to a narrowing range near the
ordinate in the (pa) diagram, this property and equation (17) imply that the socially optimal
amount of risk taking, a(Q),convergesto that value of twherei has its maximum and
=0.The optimal level of a will then converge towards unity such that, with any given a <
1,there will be too much risk taking.
In fact, when tgoesto unity, effort e approaches zero and aG(V)approachesa0(A),
themaximum feasible value of ac. To see this, rewrite (23) in the form
i[i(aG),aQ(1 — — = (1—
a)[ii'(aci) + tk]. (27)
Clearly, t—Iimplies that ii'(,a) —+—k, thecondition characterizing point A.Conversely,if
t<1,an equilibrium at point Aisimpossible. For one thing, the left hand side of (27) is now
strictly positive since 1> 0 and (I— t)>0. For another, the right-hand side of (27) would be
negative if ji' =—k andt< 1.This becomes immediately obvious by differentiating the right-
hand side of equation (27) with regard to t.Asthe derivative is positive (namely +k),t < I
implies a value less than zero.
These findings can be summarized as follows.
Proposition 5: Thereis a critical value for the deductible proportion of self-insurance efforts
greater than zero and smaller than one which generates an equilibrium with the optimal
amount of risk taking and inequality. Higher '.'alues imply too little risk taking and inequality,
lower values too much. The critical value is an increasing function of the tax rate and
approaches unity as the tax rate does so.
Proposition6:While there is always some seif-insurance effort f the tax rate is less than one,
this effort will go to zero when the tax rate approaches one while the deductible proportion of
se/f-insurance efforts is a constant strictly less than one. In the limiting case, the society will
operate beyond the maximum of the self-insu.-ance line where a higher average income could
be reached by a reduction in pre-tax inequality.19
Proposition 6 confirms the scepticism of those who doubt that redistribution is an
efficiency enhancing or even legitimate part of government activity. Since it will be impossible
in practice to make all self-insurance efforts tax deductible (a =1),it is unavoidable that an
ongoing growth of the welfare state will eventually push the economy to the wrong side of its
risk-return opportunity space and eliminate all self-insurance efforts. When the government
absorbs all risks, excessive risk taking is the obvious consequence.
The disincentive effects of the welfare state may indeed be so strong that society on the
whole loses from the existence of this state. Figure 6 demonstrates such a possibility.
On the other hand, Proposition 5 ensures that with moderate tax rates and a suitably
chosen value of a between zero and one, the socially optimal risk allocation can, in principle,
be reproduced with decentralized decision making. Redistributive taxation would then indeed
have the beneficial insurance and risk taking effects described in section 3.
Of course it is difficult to draw direct policy conclusions on the size of a from an
abstract model like this one. However, to be on the safe side it would be better to chose a high
value of a rather than a low one. Truly detrimental effects can only occur when a is too small.
When it is too high, the welfare gain from redistributional taxation will not be maximal, but at
least there will be some gain. The insurance effect will in this case be fully present, and part of
the potential welfare gain from risk taking can also be exploited.
Figure 6: The Welfare Loss from an Overdrawn Welfare State (t—* 1)
TV
A'. V' y20
For practicaltaxsystems this mcans that a move from capital income taxes towards
cash tiow taxes on capital is advisable as well as all measures which the optimal tax literature
recommends tbr minimizing the labor-leisure distortion. In particular, the investment in human
capital which may be the most important self-insurance activity in a market economy should be
made fully tax deductible
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1 low redistrihutive taxation will affect the equality of incomes is an old economic question.
With any pre-tax income distribution the variance of post-tax incomes is clearly reduced by
redistrihutive taxation However, people may react by taking more risks so that the pre-tax
inequality rises Flow strong is this countervailing effect? Is it possible that it offsets the
primary effect?
Section 4 showed, among other things, that the introduction of a linear redistribution
system will increase the equilibrium pre-tax inequality. Before the impact of a tax rate change
on the post-tax distribution can be considered, the marginal analogue of that result has to be
proved
Proposition 7 A niargiiuilii:crease in thetaxrate will increase the equilibrium inequality of
pre—lux incomes.






i'(a. i(l —at)/(l — t). (31)
Here, the indifference curve slope i and 1s derivatives i and i0 are functions of and 0, where
= i(a.) and o (i —21
To sign (28) consider first the numerator. It is clearly positive. For one thing, property
(d) of the inditkrence curves ensures that ip>0.For another, if ai'—(I—a)k is
substracted fI-om both sides of' equation (23), it k)llows ailer a few algebraic manipulations that
(32)
Since it is known loin Proposition 6 and the preceding discussion that ' +kispositive and
will only in the limititig case 'r —> I approach ZCfO, it follows that
for and t < I, (33)
a result that vill also he needed below
Consider the demoninator next. The terms y and 6 measure the marginal changes of the
slope of the indifference curve and the individual opportunity line, respectively, brought about
by a rightward movement along the redistributionline (andalong neither a given indifference
curve nor a given individual opportunity line). It is shown in the appendix that y —6 > 0 is a
stability condition for the equilibrium and that the existence of a stable equilibrium is ensured
The correspondence principle therefore implies that a( /dt >0. Q.e.d.
Consider now post-tax incomes. Since = (I — t)G [from (9) and (21)] is the standard
(leviatlon ol the income distribution net of taxes and public transfers, it holds that
dci dat. —=(l--t)---—-—G. (34)
dt dt
Using (28), (29), and (30) this expression can be transformed to
- I-at o;1,L(ao)+I,t (;)1t (35)
dt
ihe sign of(35) is ambiguous. Since 'y —ö >0, it equals the sign of the numerator.
Note first that da/dt <0 if i' is sufficiently strongly negative. A negative sign for
t' indicates a curved self-insurance line and decreasing returns to risk takingWith a strongly
negative value of' i', the scope for individual reactions to a tax increaseis small, and
obviously the direct etIct of a tax increase dominates.22
A more interesting possibility is the one where ji' is a positive constant in the relevant
range such that f'= 0. In this case, equation (35) simplifies to
d3—0.i1.I' —= forp. =const. (36)
dt y—ô
Recalling property (e) of the indifference curve system and (33) this expression can easily be
interpreted.
Proposition 81 Supposethere areconstant re/urns to risk taking in the relevant range. Then,
with decreasing absolute risk aversion (i <0), an expansion of the redistribution system wi/l
imply an equilibrium with more post-tax inequality. The same will be true with constant
absolute risk aversion (i =0)provided that less than 100 % of self-i nsurance efforts are tax
deductible. With constant absolute risk aversion andfull deductibility of self-insurance efforts
the equilibrium post-/ax inequality will not be affected by the tax rate.16
Proposition 8 describes a redistribution paradox because it specifies conditions under
which the primary effect on equality of increased taxes will be overcompensated by the
secondary effect of increased risk taking. This gives a deeper meaning to the statement made in
the introduction that the risk taking effect of redistributive taxation may be more important
than the insurance effect. In the cases considered, people transform more than 100 % of the
increase in equality through redistributive taxation into income increases. Redistributive
taxation does not improve the distribution of the pie's slices, but it makes the pie bigger.
'6Thc proposition is related to a result that in anothcr context had been derived by Atkinson and Stiglitz (1980,
p.1 19). These authors studied redistributive taxation in the context of the standardtwo assetportfolioproblem
[where the (i,)trade-offis automatically constant] and found that taxation increases "private risk taking' if
the wealth elasticity of demand for the risky asset is positive.23




Anintuitive explanation of Proposition 8 can be given with the aid of Figure 7. This
figure incorporates the cases of constant and decreasing absolute risk aversion and assumes
that a equals unity (full deductibility of effort). The self-insurance line is linear in the relevant
range, and so is the redistribution line. The equilibrium is characterized by a point onthe
redistribution line which is also a point of tangency between an indifference curve and the
individual opportunity line. Depending on the level of government transfers, the latter can have
a continuum of alternative positions. For the case at hand (a =1),it is known from (24) that
the individual opportunity line has the same slope as the self-insurance line. The possible
positions of the individual opportunity line can therefore be constructed by parallel shifts of the
self-insurance line to the left. When absolute risk aversion is constant, the indifference curve
slope stays constant when .x increases, given cr (s =0).The equilibrium point V on the
redistribution line will therefore be vertically above the laissez-faire point T, while the point
characterizing the pre-tax distribution shifts from T to V on the self-insurance line. The
advantage of the protection that the redistribution scheme offers is entirely translated into a
higher average income.
On the basis of this neutrality result, it is easy to see under which conditions the
equilibrium point V' will be to the right of the laissez-faire point T. A first andobvious









This case prevails under decreasing absolute risk aversion. For any given level of post-tax
inequality, pre-tax inequality and average income rise with an introduction of the redistribution
scheme. The rise in average income lowers the required marginal compensation, i(,c), for
risk taking. The actual marginal compensation perceived by the individual, T, is constant, on
the other hand. Hence, an equilibrium with a higher level of post-tax inequality will result.
Figure 5 illustrates this with the upper of the two solution points labelled V.
The second reason (not demonstrated in the figure) for an equilibrium with a higher
inequality in post-tax incomes is incomplete deductibility of self-insurance efforts (a <I). The
incomplete deductibility means that the decision maker perceives an additional incentive to
reduce his effort and to move along the self-insurance line towards higher values of pre-tax
inequality. In Figure 7, the individual opportunity line would have a higher slope than the self-
insurance line and so the solution point V' would be to the right of T even in the case where
absolute risk aversion is constant (s =0)17
Theconditions under which the redistribution paradox emerges are not implausible.
From an empirical point of view, there can be little doubt that decreasing absolute risk aversion
and less than thil deductibility of self-insurance efforts are realistic assumptions. So the
assumption of constant returns to risk taking is crucial. With the specifications of this model
this assumption is only a limiting case. However, other model specifications may rather give
the impression that constant returns to scale are an intermediate case in the spectrum of
possibilities. For example, when there are decreasing returns to self-insurance while, at the
same time, it is possible for an agent to add up independent income risks, then it is entirely
unclear whether there will be increasing or deceasing returns to risk taking, since adding up
independent income risks in itself implies increasing returns to risk taking. Increasing returns to
risk taking would strengthen the mechanism underlying the redistribution paradox.
6. The Optimal Welfare State
Up till now it has been assumed that the government is a fairly passive agent satisfying itself
with adjusting the public transfer so as to balance the government budget. What if the
17This effect is operative even when ji=0.Cf. the discussion of the next section, in particular equation (40).25
government choses the tax rate so as to maximize the representative individual's expected
utility? What are the characteristics of the optimal welfare state?
To make the problem interesting it has to be assumed that a <1so that at least some
moral hazard effect is present. With a =1the model would predict an optimal tax rate of one,
since successive tax increases would always generate welfare increasing insurance and risk
taking effects. Assuming that at least part of the agent's effort results in a loss of non-market
income is common to the optimal tax literature.
The problem of optimal taxation is illustrated in Figure 8. For every tax rate t,thereis
an equilibrium as described by equation (23). Starting from the laissez-faire point T, an
increase in the tax rate will therefore induce a movement to the right along the self-insurance
line (Proposition 7). In addition, the tax increase will move the redistribution line (cf Figure 1)
to the left. The net effect on the equilibrium combinations of tanda attainable through
successive tax rate changes is illustrated by the arrowed curve in Figure 8 which will be called
the "equilibrium line". It is known from Proposition 6 that the equilibrium line ends at point A'
on the ordinate when the tax rate approaches one. (A' is the counterpart of A on the self-
insurance line which is characterized by an absence of self-insurance effort.) The optimal tax
rate is determined by a point like Z' where an indifference curve is tangent to the equilibrium
line. Z' and its counterpart Z on the self-insurance line coincide with points like V' and V in
Figure 5 if that figure is drawn for the optimal tax rate. The magnitude of the tax rate equals
the distance Z' Z relative to the distance between Z and the ordinate.26
Figure 8: One Version of/he Optimal TaxProblem
Let d0(t) be a function that summarizes the relationship between the equilibrium
amount of pre-tax inequality and the tax rate as calculated with (28). Then the problem of
optimal taxation can be stated as foIlows:8
max U(p.,a)
Go
s.t.J.1 (a0), a =(i—t)a0, C0 = (37)
Let (dU / dt) / U denote the tax-induced welfare change in terms of certainty equivalents or




where i =z(l.L,cT)is the indifference curve slope as defined in (15). A change in the tax rate
generally alters t and a. The right-hand side of equation (38) evaluates these alterations. The
term i .ois the direct gain from redistrbution, given individual behavior; i.e., the insurance
effect. The term (t)[i'_i(l —t)]is the welfare change resulting from the increase in risk
taking: it consists of a change in per capi:a income,•ji', and a change in post-tax inequality
evaluated at the individual's "price of risk'(the indifference curve slope), i .(i —
Thisformulation incorporates the government bulget constraint through the assumption =jI(o0).
A'27
From (17) it is known that, if risk taking is at the socially optimal level given the tax
rate, then i'—i (i —= 0.As this includes the laissez-faire situation where t= o,the first bit
of redistributive taxation must increase welfare through the direct gain from redistribution; i.e.,
(dU / dt)/ LI =1 > 0at t= 0.At t= 1,according to Proposition 6, effort is zero so that
=—k <0.Since, in addition, i =i(j.i,a)=0,from property (a) of the indifference curve
system,the marginal increase in welfare approaches (dU/ dt)/ U =—(t)k<0 as t—+ 1.
This implies that there is an interior solution for the optimal tax rate such as the one illustrated
in Figure 8.
In the optimum, it is necessary that (d.t / th) / U =0,which means that the welfare
gain from the insurance effect is outweighed by a welfare loss resulting from excessive risk
taking:
'•G=—(t)[I'(c0)--i(1—t)]>0. (39)
Since i .> 0and>0,it is necessary for (39) to be true that ji'i(i— c) <i. A comparison
with (17) shows that this condition implies an equilibrium point on the redistribution line to the
right of the constrained social optimum Q'.Theresult can be summarized as follows.
Proposition 9: J'7w,i self-insurance efforts are not fully t-deductible, there is an interior
solution for the socially optimal tax rate. In the optimum, risk taking and inequality overshoot
the constrained social optimum, given a tax rate at the level of the optimal rate.
The overshooting of risk taking may be substantial. In the case considered in Figure 8,
it even implies moving to a point to the right of the maximum of the self-insurance line, where
the marginal return to risk taking is negative.28
Figure 9: Optimal Taxation and the Redistribution Paradox
Figure 8 does not, however, depict the only possible case. An alternative possibility is
illustrated in Figure 9. Here the equilibrium line performs a loop, and the optimal size of the
redistributive system is found before the maxima of the self-insurance line and the equilibrium
line are reached. The solution is now located in the range of positive marginal returns to risk
taking (albeit still in the range where the marginal return to risk taking is unable to compensate
for the resulting marginal increase in inequality).
Since o is a monotonically increasing function of t,andl.Lisa concave fi.inction of
o, a necessary and sufficient condition for a loop in the equilibrium line is that, at the maxima
of the two curves, a redistribution paradox is present; i.e., it is necessary that, in the
neighborhood of the point where ji' =0,post-tax inequality rises with an increase in the tax
rate.
To check whether and under what conditions this can be the case, insert (29),(30),and





Equation (40) shows that the curvature of the self-insurance line, I' ',isessential for the
existence of a loop. If the self-insurance line is sufficiently curved, then dc / dt <0 and there
will be no loop. If it is sufficiently flat, there will be one. General continuity arguments imply
A
A29
that dc I dt will be strictly positive in the neighborhood of the maximum of i(Q) if j'stays
sufficiently small in that neighborhood.
The interesting aspect of the solution illustrated in Figure 9 is that the redistribution
paradox is present when the size of the welfare state has been optimized. A marginal increase
in the tax rate increases average income, but this advantage is outweighed by an increase in
post-tax inequality.
The nature of the two kinds of solution becomes apparent when equation (34) is
inserted into (39). The resulting version of the optimality condition,
da_
(41)
shows that 1' and dc / dt will have the same sign. In the case depicted in Figure (9), the
common sign is indeed positive; in the case depicted in Figure 8 it is negative. The following
proposition emphasizes the interesting aspects of this result.
Proposition 10: With an optimal size of the redistributive lax system, one of the two following
conditions will hold. Either the economy operates at a point on its self-insurance line where,
giventhetax rate, more inequality results in a smaller average income. Or more
redistribution causesmore inequalityin post-tax incomes and a higher average income.
Although it contradicts popular views, Proposition 10 is a very natural and
straightforward implication of a preference for equality when -asin the present model -the
inequality of pre-tax incomes is an increasing fi.inction of the tax rate. Obviously, in the
optimum, a marginal tax change must not induce adverse movements of average incomeand
post-tax inequality for, if it did, a tax reform could be designed that increaseswelfare. Instead a
marginal tax change must either decrease post-tax inequality and average income orhave
precisely the reverse effect. In the former case, a fall in average income coincideswith an
increase in pre-tax inequality; thus, given the redistribution scheme, the economy's technology
implies a positive relationship between the size of the pie and the equality in thedistribution of
its slices. In the latter case, more redistribution increases the pie, but makes its distribution
more unequal30
7.Concluding Remarks
In this paper an attempt has been made tocontribute to the understanding ofwhy the welfare
state emerged and which laws and regularities govern its performance. The model developed
for that purpose is admittedly abstract, leaving out many aspects that economic models of
distribution normally contain. However, it concentrates on the uncertainty created for the
individual by the inequality of market incomes. Arguably, insuring against this uncertainty, and
thus stimulating private risk taking, constitute the main functions of the welfare state.
At first sight, it may seem that income uncertainty is too unimportant to justify the
insurance interpretation of redistributive taxation. Indeed, if the model is interpreted as
applying to a short period, say a year, there does not appear to be all that much uncertainty. As
uncertainty is resolved only gradually with the passage of time, most of the observable
inequality by the end of the year would have been predictable from the inequality already
knownat thebeginning of the year. Things are very different, though, when the model is seen
asapplyingtolifetimeinequality orperhapseven toinequalityevolving over the life span of
dynasties. In the absense of information about both their unborn children's innate abilities and
the opportunities the economy will offer them, parents-to-be may well be interested in the
broad-based 'career insurance contract" that the welfare state provides. They should, in
principle, be able to design this contract in a way that ensures an efficient comromise between
its insurance, risk taking and moral hazard effects. It is true that parents will be able to predict
some of the next gerneration's inequality. After all, the parents-to-be may well know how
many children they will have and what they will bequeath to them. Yet, it is also true that
major aspects of their children's lifetime careers will remain totally obscure. It is this that may
induce parents to protect their children with a redistribution contract even in cases where this
contract may not be perfectly fair in the actuar al sense.
Part of the difficulty with the insurar ce interpretation of the welfare state is a time
consistency problem. After the children have been born, have grown up, and have found their
positions in the market economy, nearly all of the uncertainty will have been resolved and,
naturally, they will then segregate into groups who like the welfare state and others who dislike
it.The latter may, indeed, even try to opt out of the social contract which they, or their parents,31
had welcomed from an ex ante point of view. Obviously, a binding redistribution commitment
is necessary to make the insurance contract possible andtoenjoy the protection it offers.
When the welfare state was firmly embedded into a closed nation state, such a
commitment was nota problem.The rich who had to pay could not leave the country, and the
poor from other countries who could qualif' as recipients of public funds could not immigrate.
Things will be different in the new Europe where the nation states are facing open borders that
allow free migration of goods, factors, people, and tax bases. Opening the borders, however
beneficial this will be for the allocation of resources, has the disadvantages of loosening the
commitment to fulfill the obligations from the redistribution contract and of admitting people at
a stage where it is known that they are needy.
Suppose the model developed above is extended to a set of identical welfare states
between which costless migration is possible at any time, and consider a competitive situation
where the single states choose their taxes and transfer levels independently of one another.
Under these circumstances, the optimal size of the welfare state as derived in section 6 cannot
be maintained and, in fact, the welfare state as such will collapse.
Each single state will have an incentive to cut its taxes and reduce its public
expenditure, so that people from the lower end of the income scale will emigrate and people
from theupperend will immigrate. Those who emigrate will not be hurt, because they can find
the same conditions elsewhere. Those who stay will gain, because they pay less or receive
more from the government. And those who immigrate will gain because they pay less than they
would have had to pay in other countries. From the single country's isolated perspective, the
policy of "turning the welfare state around" seems an unambiguous welfare improvement. The
only problem is that, if all countries behave that way they will end up in a situation without
redistribution. The welfare gains from the instirance and risk taking effects, on which this paper
elaborated, cannot survive in systems competition.
Created as a protection against outside attacks and internal disparities, the European
nation state has since developed into the modern welfare state, which takes care of individuals
and shelters them against the inequalities inherent to a market economy. The rapid economic
and political integration of Europe has gradually begun to erode the foundations of the nation32
state.Protection against the neighbors will no longer be necessary, and protection against
internal risks may become less and less feasible, as economic integration proceeds. The nation
state will lose its insurance ftrnction. Only time can tell whether a replacement can be found.
Appendix: Stability of Equilibrium
Consider equation (23). Let
(Al)
denotethe value of the left hand side of equation (23) on the redistribution line and let
— I—att q()p.(c) +—(1—a)k (A2) l—t l—t
denotethe value of the right-hand side. The functions i(0) and q(a0) give slopes of the
indifference curves and the individual opportunity lines, respectively, along the redistribution
line; i.e. for the set of potential equilibria satisf'ing the government budget constraint. By the
definitions of y and ö in equations (30) and (31),
(A3)
q'(OQ) =ö i"(a0)(l—at)/(l—t). (A4)
Since the second-order condition of problem (23) is satisfied (concavity of individual
opportunity line given p and convexity of indifference curves), the individual will increase c0
when l()<q(G0) and reduce GQ when i(c0)>q(a0). The government, in turn, will
adjust the transfer p so as to balance it budget. Obviously, local stability of the mutual
adjustment process requires that, in some neighborhood of the equilibrium level of a0, a0 (v),
z(a) {}q(a0)
{}v) (A5)
which is equivalent to saying that, when o =
(A7)33
FigureAl illustrates this. Points (1) and (2) represent equilibria, but only (2) is stable, because
therethe curve 1(a0)cuts the curve q(a0)frombelow.
Figure Al: Stable and Unstable Equilibria
i. q
Knowingthepropertiesof a stable equilibrium raises the question of whether the
equilibria analyzed in section 4 are stable. To answer this question, note first that q'(a0) ￿ 0
since i' '0. Thus q is a declining function of a, though not necessarily a monotonically
declining function: there may be linear segments in the self-insurance line.
Consider next the function 1(a0). It is not obvious whether this function is "well-
behaved" since tanda change along the redistribution line and both variables affect the
indifference curve slope. Figure A2 illustrates in a schematic way how the slope depends on the
shape of the von-Neumann-Morgenstern function and the segment of the redistribution line in
which a0 may lie. The segment T'Q'isthe range between the laissez-faire point T and the
social optimum Q'.Thesegment Q'B' is the range between the social optimum and the
maximum. And the segment B'A'isthe range between the maximum and the no-effort point A'.
(Cf. the figures in the main text and recall properties (a)-(e) of the indifference curve system as
listed in section 2).
'Jo
a(fr)34
FigureA2:Possible Shapes of the Function 1(a0)
(stylized as linear curves,)
T'Q'B'A' 4 TQ' B' A' T Q'B' A'
————---——-
Increasing absolute Constant absolute Decreasing absolute
riskaversion risk aversion risk aversion
In the case of constant absolute risk aversion, i'(a0)>O holds true throughout, since
the changes in tbroughtabout by a rightward movement along the redistribution line have no
influence on the indifference curve slope, In the cases of increasing and decreasing absolute
risk aversion the slope of the curve I is less obvious.
Note first, regardless of the preference structure, 1(a0) is positively sloped in the range
between Q'andB'. The reason is that an indifference curve is tangent to the redistribution line
at point Q'.Movementsto the right of Q'upto B' can be decomposed into movements along
an indifference curve plus horizontal movements to the right. Properties (c) and (d) of the
indifference curves ensure that both components imply increases in the indifference curve
slope. Figure A3 illustrates the argument.
Figure A3: Changes of Jndyfference Curve Slope




A similar argument can be applied to the range T Q'whenabsolute risk aversion is
increasing. A movement along the redistribution line can be decomposed into rightward and
upward movements as illustrated in Figure A3. Because of properties (e) and (d) of the
indifference curve system such movements will increase the indifference curve slope.
Finally, with decreasing absoute risk aversion, a rightward movement along the
segment B'A' will increase the indifference curve slope since properties (d) and (e) of the
indifference curve system ensure that both a decline in i.t,givena, and an increase in a, given
x, will bring about such an increase in the slope.
As illustrated by the interrogation marks in Figure A5, ambiguities remain with the
segment B'A' under increasing absolute risk aversion and with the segment T'Q'under
decreasing absolute risk aversion. Equilibria found here may be unstable, because the curve
q(a0) may be cutting the curve i(aQ) in these segments from below, even though q itself is
downward sloping.
It can be shown, however, that if equilibria occur in the ambiguous segments then they
will always include at least one stable equilibrium.
Proof: By the definition of the function (a0) from (26) it holds that
q{a(Q)} =i[a0(Q)] (A7)
if a =a[a0(Q)], wherea0(Q) is the socially optimal amount of risk taking. Differentiating
(A2) with regard to a at a0(Q) gives
=_L4[a0(Q)]÷k}<o. (A8)
da 1 —
FromProposition 5 it is known that
a{}[ao(Q)].
(A9)
Suppose an equilibrium occurs in the range B'A' under increasing absolute risk
aversion. Then a(V) >aG(Q)and a <&[a0(Q)]. Because of(A8) and (A9) it follows that
q[a0(Q)} >i[a0(Q)].Figure A2 makes it clear that this excludes the possibility that q will cut36
i only once from below in the range B'A'.(Forthis to happen it would be necessary that
q[0(Q)] <i[cYG(Q)].)
Suppose alternatively that an equilibrium occurs in the range TQ'underdecreasing
absolute risk aversion. Then a0(V) <a0(Q) and a> &[c0(Q)]. Because of(A8) and (A9) it
follows that q{a0(Q)] <i[crG(Q)], and again it becomes clear from Figure A2 that it is
impossible for q to cut ionlyonce from below in the range TQ', q.e.d.
Remark: For the special case of constant relative risk aversion a proof is available (Sinn 1985)
thati is upward sloping even in the range T?QI.Sothe equilibrium is always stable when
absolute or relative risk aversion is constant.37
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